Windows ProjFS Internals: A Technical Deep Dive
A deep dive into the Projected File System (ProjFS): how Windows projects virtual files into the file system on demand, and what that mechanism looks like under the hood.
A deep dive into the Projected File System (ProjFS): how Windows projects virtual files into the file system on demand, and what that mechanism looks like under the hood.
Recently I ran across a situation where I needed to get telemetry on the COM method CreateLxProcess’s invocation.
If you’re an offensive or defensive engineer, a Windows endpoint engineer, or a Windows researcher, chances are you’ve come across Microsoft’s Threat-Intelligence ETW provider and understand the immense value it offers for telemetry.
A walkthrough of how attackers use Windows Filtering Platform rules to silence EDR network traffic, and how products can protect themselves from this attack.
Not long ago I wrote a blog called Understanding ETW Patching where I walked through how ETW patching is a hyper-focused version of a function patch.
As of late, I have gotten a lot of questions around Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) patching, specifically the following questions:
A walk through process forking on Windows, how an adversary might leverage it, how you can identify this behavior, and where the 4688 event's metadata falls short.
A walk through ETW's core components and how they can be leveraged for offensive interprocess communications.
Recently I was handed some malware to look at and during analysis I came across an interesting code block that was dealing with setting the SessionId token member.
A deep dive into SeDebugPrivilege - which Windows security checks it actually bypasses, which ones it doesn't, and what that means for offensive and defensive work.
A walk through the client/server relationship at the heart of RPC and COM activity, and why that context is critical for detection engineering and incident response.
A deep dive into DLL hijacking - the basics, the different types of hijacks, and detection ideas for an attack that's historically been considered hard to spot.
A walkthrough of how the gmer.sys driver was abused to terminate EDR processes - and a counter-technique that uses the same driver to suspend offensive threads instead.
I’ve published blogs around telemetry mechanisms like Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) in the Uncovering Windows Events series, but one mechanism I haven’t discussed yet are kernel callback functions.
Impersonation happens often natively in Windows, however, adversaries also use it to run code in the context of another user.
Part 2 of the Defender's Guide series: how Windows services work under the hood, the metadata available for them, and how to spot service abuse in telemetry.
In a previous blog post of mine — WMI Internals Part 2: Reversing a WMI Provider I walked through how the WMI architecture is foundationally built upon COM and in turn how WMI classes can end up invoking COM methods to perform actions.
In a previous post WMI Internals Part 1: Understanding the Basics I walked through some of the basic internal information behind WMI.
Recently I have taken up an interest in WMI internals and thought I would write a blog series on some of my findings.
This past week I briefly talked about Process Access data within a talk that Olaf and I gave at ATT&CKCON 3.0 (YouTube link isn’t live yet).
The Elastic Research team recently released work surrounding stripping the Windows Defender binary (MsMpEng.exe) of its privileges, making it effectively useless.
In an attempt to understand access tokens at a deeper level as of late, I have come across a couple of members within the TOKEN structure that have connected some dots for me.